The Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel and the subsequent conflagration marked the end of the normalisation of relations in West Asia. The Abraham Accord’s peace proposal, through the convergence of interests, lost its gravity and geopolitical pre-eminence. In retaliation, Israel pounded on Gaza and south Lebanon to eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel’s determination to defang its enemies intensified its efforts and preparedness.
The gravity of the attack and counterattack finally brought Iran to the fore. The war was not limited to fighting through the proxies. Iran and Israel got engaged in the conflict directly. Though they do not share a border, the aerial passage was used to carry out the offensive and counter-offensive. This has led to the intensification of conflict in West Asia. The ceasefire is nowhere to be seen. Hubris is at an all-time high. Conflict does not seem to be culminating soon. In a prolonged war, West Asia will become even more vulnerable. The energy economy and supply of crude will take a massive hit.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke-point for oil transit. Around 20 million oil barrels are transported daily through the Strait of Hormuz from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It amounts to 30 per cent of the world’s oil trade. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Iran, Qatar, and Kuwait depend heavily on the strait for the energy supply. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iran-Israel conflict has made Iran isolated. The Arab world is a divided house. Religion is no longer a cementing force to unite them to isolate Israel. Iran’s insistence on stitching relations with the Arab countries does not seem encouraging. The Sunni-Shia sectarian divides and economic interests have reduced the importance of religion-based affiliations and shared identity. The religion-based commitments against Israel in the 1970s are no longer a conceivable reality.
Therefore, Iran makes every effort, both subtle and complex, to unite the Islamic world. Israel understands Iran’s weakness. It may make the best out of Iran’s ambivalence. This seems to be the right time to settle the conflict for a conceivably long period. Since its establishment, Israel has not found itself on surer ground so far as chronic conflicts are concerned. Iran may weaponise its choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz, to threaten the UAE and Saudi Arabia to comply with Iran and participate in its war effort with Israel.
The Salman Canal becomes pivotal to decoupling from the Iranian sphere of influence. In 2015, the proposed canal was making headlines. The canal has become an existential necessity for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A 950 km canal will connect the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Aden. This will be a seismic shift in the connectivity imagination of West Asia. It will carve its way out through the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.
The eastern province is vital for Saudi Arabia because it houses its critical oil infrastructure and resources. It will connect the Gulf of Aden through Yemen. This transit corridor will significantly help the Saudi oil supply. The time of transit and the cost of the crude oil will be minimised if this transit corridor becomes a reality.
The Iranian marine geopolitics and its hegemony around the Strait of Hormuz will not affect the supply of Saudi crude and its neighbours. Iran may use the Houthis to cause disruption, but they are much lesser players than Iran. The Salman Canal blueprint was brought to the public in 2015 after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran. Saudi fear was quite valid then, as it is now.
The rise of Iran meant Saudi secondariness. The rivalries between the two are always intense. The undercurrents of this rivalry are difficult to restrict. The ongoing whirlpool of things in West Asia on account of Iran-Israel antagonism brings the matter of constructing the canal back to the action table. Saudi neutrality undergirds its interests.
In the age of global warming, the dependence on the oil economy will decline sharply. The oil reserves may dry up over time. The Salman Canal will give the necessary boost to the Saudi effort to diversify its economic dependencies. It will encourage both local and international tourism. Like the Suez Canal, which generates good revenue for Egypt, the Salman Canal will emerge as a significant source of revenue generation.
It will revive the empty quarter. It will create jobs and build new cities along the canal. Industries for desalination will emerge. Its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz will be significantly minimised. Iran’s geopolitics around the Strait of Hormuz will not be intensive anymore.
Other regional partners such as Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE will greatly benefit from the Salman Canal. Iran will lose its bargaining potential and economic benefits. It will be the financial strangulation of Iran.
Iran’s choking tactics will not work. It has been observed that Iran’s blockading tactics have affected oil supplies in the past and led to a corresponding increase in the oil price. Its coercive geostrategic checkmate will not work anymore. Such recurrences used to impact the global market. Therefore, the Salman Canal will decrease Iran’s sphere of influence and heft in West Asia.
Since this canal is proposed to pass through the eastern province, major Saudi oil fields are located there. Ghawar, Khurais, Berri, Safaniya, Shaybah, Abqaiq, and Qatif are in the eastern province. The headquarters of Saudi Aramco, the Saudi national oil company, is also located there in Dhahran. The richest oil fields in the eastern province are the Ghawar Oil Field, Khobar, Dammam, Al Khafji, and Jubail. The eastern province is also predominantly Shia. Shia Muslims constitute around 10-12 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s population.
The human rights watchdogs have reported alleged Saudi discrimination against the Shia people. Iran has utilised this to score brownie points and project Saudi Arabia in a negative light. However, the eastern province is important for Saudi Arabia. It has been loaded with critical infrastructures and oil reserves.
Since this canal is proposed to pass through the eastern province, it will be a great connectivity asset for Saudi Arabia. It will make the Saudi economy invincible and diverse. Its Vision 2030 will be truly fulfilled. The Salman Canal will emerge as a significant alternative to the dependencies on the Strait of Hormuz. It will weaken Iran’s geopolitics around the Strait.
Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University (A Central University), Itanagar. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.