China has given significant importance to both accelerating and expanding its nuclear arsenal in recent years. It wants to gradually catch up with Russia and the US, who have nearly 12 times larger arsenal. It is estimated that China now possesses roughly 500 nuclear warheads, and numbers and quality are growing faster than the other nuclear weapon powers.
China continues to develop its three new missile silo fields for solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and expanded the construction of new silos for its liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs. It has been developing new variants of ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems. China has also expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force, which appears to have completely replaced the medium-range DF-21 in the nuclear role.
At sea, China has been refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. China has operational nuclear missions for its H-6N bombers and is developing an air-launched ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability.
Nuclear Warhead Stockpile
The Pentagon’s 2023 report to Congress assessed that China now has approximately 500 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, road-mobile systems, and bombers.
The report further estimates that China’s arsenal will increase to about 1,000 warheads by 2030. Many of these will be deployed at higher levels of readiness and fielded on systems capable of hitting targets around the globe. China is likely to have 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.
China’s Secrecy and Analysis from Inferences
It is not easy to estimate China’s military and nuclear programs because of a closed society and high levels of secrecy and tight control on all data and access on social media. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military parades, and satellite imagery helps. Satellite imagery has often helped identify air, missile, and navy bases, as well as potential underground storage facilities. China’s nuclear facilities mostly follow similar patterns, designs, and dimensions. Interestingly, China’s missile designations normally indicate the number of stages that the missile contains; the DF-26 is a two-stage missile, while the DF-31 is a three-stage missile.
China’s Fissile Materials Production Supports Numbers
The International Panel on Fissile Materials assessed that at the end of 2022, China had a stockpile of approximately 14 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and approximately 2.9 tonnes of separated plutonium were available for nuclear weapons. These were considered sufficient to support a doubling of the stockpile from 250 to 500 in the last five years. Producing another 1,000 warheads by 2035 would require additional fissile materials. China is expanding and diversifying its capability to produce tritium, and also in 2023, China reportedly began operating two large new centrifuge enrichment plants and significantly increased domestic plutonium production capabilities.
China is likely to acquire significant stocks of plutonium by using its civilian reactors. Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company, has been a great support for nuclear fuel for China’s reactors. To extract plutonium from its spent nuclear fuel, China has nearly completed its first civilian reprocessing plant and is expected to be operational in 2025. They are also already constructing a second plant. They will thus have nearly 250 tonnes-per-year fuel reprocessing capacity.
Once both fast-breeder reactors come online, they could potentially produce large amounts of plutonium and, by some estimates, could enable China to acquire over 330 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium annually for new warhead production.
Chinese Nuclear Forces
The US projections of Chinese nuclear capability have often been exaggerated. The Pentagon’s annual China Military Power Report (CMPR-2023) to Congress projected that China could have 700 deliverable warheads by 2027, possibly 1,000 by 2030, and 1,500 warheads by 2035. It is assumed that several dozen of the new warheads may have been produced but not yet fielded. The Chinese spokesperson Wu Qian criticised the 2023 CMPR, saying it “exaggerated and sensationalised the non-existent Chinese military threat”. But China did not deny the expansion of the mobile ICBM force or the construction of three large new missile silo fields.
It is clear that China no longer intends to field a minimal deterrent and instead strives for a form of nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. The number of threats presented by China will one day exceed the number of threats that currently Russia presents. China’s investments in nuclear command and control and evolving launch under warning and launch under attack capabilities indicate improved readiness. China, one day, seeks to match, or in some areas surpass, quantitative and qualitative parity with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons.
However, the ground reality is that even the projected 1,500 warheads by 2035 would still be less than half of the current US nuclear stockpile. China highlights this to allay fears of threat and also refuses to join negotiations for nuclear arms reduction. The US argues that more than numbers, what matters is what is operationally fielded, the status of forces, and the posture of those fielded forces.
Nuclear Testing
China’s nuclear testing program has supported the development of the warhead type currently arming the DF-31-class ICBMs and equipping the liquid-fuelled DF-5B ICBM with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology, replacing the much larger warhead used on the DF-5A. The large DF-41 and the JL-3 could potentially use the same smaller warhead. The Pentagon believes that China probably seeks a “lower-yield” nuclear warhead for the DF-26.
Some expansion of China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site has been seen in open-source satellite imagery with the construction of one new tunnel and around a dozen concrete buildings near the site’s airfield. Also can be seen are new drainage areas, drill rigs, roads, and covered entrances to potential underground facilities and storage areas. If China conducts low-yield nuclear tests at Lop Nur, it would violate its responsibility under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty it has signed but not ratified.
Land-based Ballistic Missiles
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) currently operates approximately 350 launchers for land-based missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads. Nearly half of these can reach the United States mainland. Most of China’s ballistic missile launchers do not have nuclear strike missions. Nearly 100 nuclear warheads are perhaps meant for regional range intermediate missiles.
The PLARF currently has approximately 45 brigades with ballistic or cruise missile launchers. Over half of these may have nuclear capability. The missile silos are normally placed roughly three kilometres apart in a triangular grid pattern. The fields could span nearly 1000 square kilometres. They include several tunnels for warhead storage. There are strong air defences at each field.
Currently, each Chinese ICBM missile brigade has 6 to 12 launchers. The DF-31A is an extended-range, single-warhead version of the DF-31 with a range of 11,200 kilometres, and can reach the continental United States. China now deploys a total of about 24 DF-31As in two brigades. The DF-41 is China’s first road-mobile and silo-based ICBM with MIRV capability. Approximately 28 DF-41 launchers may be deployed. China appears to be considering additional launch options for DF-41 including rail-mobile and silo basing. China is also developing a new missile, DF-27, with a range between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometres. It could be a conventionally armed ballistic missile. DF-27 strongly resembles the DF-26 with an attached conical hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
In February 2023, China conducted a developmental flight test of a multirole HGV for the DF-27, which flew for around 12 minutes and travelled approximately 2,100 kilometres. China is developing advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic HGV and a fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) system. In July 2021, China conducted a test of a new FOB system equipped with an HGV. It hit its target after flying around the world. An operational FOB/HGV system would pose challenges for the world.
The once-dominant DF-21 missile family is now in the process of converting to the longer-range DF-26 IRBM or the DF-31AG ICBM. DF-21s are now serving only a conventional role. With its approximate 4,000-kilometer range, the dual-role DF-26 can target US bases in Guam and all of India. A DF-26 with a conventional warhead could potentially be misinterpreted as the launch of a nuclear weapon. The US is preparing Guam for ballistic missile defence in the event of a China War.
Sea-based Nuclear Deterrence
China currently fields six second-generation Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The two newest SSBNs are believed to be improved variants of the original Type 094 design. They could carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These Jin-class SSBNs carry either the 7,200-kilometre range JL-2 SLBM or the longer-range JL-3 (10,000 kilometres) SLBM.
The range of the JL-2 was sufficient to target up to Hawaii and the whole of India from waters near China. The longer-range JL-3s can target parts of the continental United States. The JL-3 can deliver “multiple” warheads per missile.
Chinese SSBNs are still noisier compared with current US and Russian missile submarines. This remains a constraint and a challenge in operations. China is now all set to develop the quieter third-generation (Type 096) SSBN. It is speculated that the Type 096 will carry 24 missiles. 16 remains the more realistic figure, albeit missiles with longer range. China may finally have around 10 such submarines.
Chinese submarines are on “near-continuous” patrol. China has yet to begin “deterrence patrol”, implying a submarine at sea having nuclear weapons on board. Having nuclear warheads on deployed submarines during peacetime would be a new dimension for China, because China has maintained historical reluctance to hand out nuclear warheads to the armed services.
When at sea, China’s SSBNs typically appear to be accompanied by a protection detail, including surface warships and aircraft capable of tracking adversary submarines. Given the noise level of the SSBNs, it seems likely that China during the conflict would keep the submarines inside a protected “stronghold” in the South China Sea. But to target North America they would have to sail out significantly.
Strategic Bombers
China developed several types of nuclear bombs and used aircraft to deliver around 12 of the nuclear weapons that it tested between 1965 and 1979. Later, the rocket force took over. Still, China maintained a small inventory of around 20 gravity bombs for potential contingency use by aircraft. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) newly re-assigned nuclear mission is centred around the upgraded H-6K version with an extended-range. The H-6N is another variant with a nose-mounted in-flight refuelling probe and carries air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM).
The ALBM appears to bear resemblance to China’s DF-21 MRBM. When fully developed, this nuclear ALBM will, for the first time, provide China with a viable nuclear ‘triad’ of land, sea, and air delivery.
The H-6 will eventually be replaced with the under-developed H-20 stealth bomber with longer range and improved capabilities. It will have both a nuclear and a conventional capability with a range exceeding 10,000 kilometres.
China’s Nuclear Doctrine
From 1964, when China made its first nuclear test, it has continued to unconditionally maintain a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. China continues to officially seek minimum deterrence and pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defence.
The minimum deterrence doesn’t define numbers or quality and does not prohibit a massive expansion. The posture apparently seeks to adapt to the development of the world’s strategic situation. They continue to create ambiguity by putting nuclear and conventional strike forces under the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which controls both China’s nuclear and conventional arsenal of land-based ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles.
China is investing significantly to ensure the survivability of the nuclear arsenal against a nuclear or conventional first strike, including practicing nuclear attack survival exercises. China maintains a portion of its units in a heightened state of readiness while leaving the others in peacetime status with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.
China maintains a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces and relies on space- and ground-based sensors that would warn of an enemy missile strike and give China time to launch its missiles before they would be destroyed. China is likely to have at least three early warning satellites in orbit to support its LOW posture.
For decades, China has deployed silo-based DF-5s and road-mobile ICBMs that, in a crisis, would be armed with the intention to launch them before they are destroyed. In fairness to China, both the United States and Russia do the same.
China is developing an indigenous HQ-19 anti-ballistic missile system as well as a hit-to-kill mid-course interceptor (like American THAAD) that could engage intermediate-range ballistic missiles and possibly ICBMs, although it may still take many years to develop. China already maintains several ground-based large phased-array radars that contribute to its early-warning capabilities. China reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if its nuclear forces were attacked with conventional weapons.
Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Capability
The expansion of the nuclear forces would gradually shape Chinese nuclear strategy. There could be an element of coercion. China’s advanced non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic, could also provide a strategic strike capability that may achieve effects similar to a first use of nuclear weapons. Could they use such a threat to limit the US presence in the East and South China Seas and achieve reunification with Taiwan?
Implications for India
China is working to catch up with the US in nuclear capability in both numbers and quality, albeit it has some way to go. India and China continue to have serious boundary issues even though they may have wrapped up Line of Actual Control disengagement in eastern Ladakh for the moment. It took 4.5 years of strained face-off to reach this point. It remains a delicate balance. China wants to thwart India’s progress to remain the unquestioned leader in Asia and also to dent the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, where India is a key player.
India does maintain the nuclear triad with land-based nuclear missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-missile-armed submarines (SSBNs), and strategic fighter-bombers. Agni-V with 7,000-8,000 kilometres is deployed. It covers all of China. Agni-VI, with a 10,000-12,000 kilometres range, is under development. India has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities and a growing anti-ballistic missile system.
India currently has around 170 nuclear warheads. This was a reasonable number when China had around 300 warheads. With China now greatly modernising and expanding nuclear weapons, it is time for India to reassess and plan. Many analysts are suggesting 250 warheads by 2025 and 500 by 2030. India also needs to increase MIRV-based ballistic missiles and strengthen its ABM capabilities. India must target having six each of SSBNs and SSNs. Yet India must continue its No First Use (NFU) and credible minimum deterrence policies.
The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.